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VARIATIONS ON A THEME: APPLICATION OF
MASSON V. NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, INC. TO A
SPECTRUM OF MISQUOTATION LIBEL CASES
In December 1983 Janet Malcolm, a freelance writer, published a twopart article in The New Yorker magazine.' Malcolm's article largely was
concerned with the dismissal of Jeffrey M. Masson, a psychoanalyst, from
the employ of the Sigmund Freud Archives (the Archives). 2 During his
tenure as projects director of the Archives, Masson publicly voiced his belief
regarding Sigmund Freud's abandonment of Freud's seduction theory.'
Masson believed that Freud had abandoned the seduction theory to placate
skeptical colleagues and, thus, advance Freud's career.4 Malcolm substantially based her article upon a series of interviews she conducted with
Masson, during which Masson discussed his views on Freud, Masson's
dismissal, and other topics, including Masson's personal life. 5 On November
29, 1984, Masson filed in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California a diversity action against Malcolm, The New Yorker
and Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. (Knopf)-the publisher of a book by Malcolm
that is based upon the same interviews 6 -alleging violation of the California
civil libel statute. 7 Specifically, Masson's complaint charged that, with the
knowledge of The New Yorker and Knopf, Malcolm had knowingly placed
in quotation marks remarks that Masson had never uttered, thus attributing
them to Masson, and had misleadingly edited other quotations, to the effect
that Masson appeared 'unscholarly, irresponsible, vain [and] lacking impersonal [sic] honesty and moral integrity."' 8
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the United States Supreme Court
injected a constitutional requirement into libel actions brought by public

1. Malcolm, Trouble At The Archives, Naw YoRKER, Dec. 5, 1983, at 59 & Dec. 12,
1983, at 60.
2. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1536 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd,
111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
3. Id.Through his seduction theory, Freud proposed that sexual abuse in childhood is
the genesis of certain mental illnesses. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (N.D. Cal.
1987) (describing defendant Knopf's role as publisher of IN m Fazun ARcHcEs), aff'd 895
F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
7.Masson, 895 F.2d at 1536. Relevant portions of the California Civil Code read:
"[E]very person has ... the right of protection from ... defamation.... ." CAL. CiV. CODE
§ 43 (West.1982); "Defamation is effected by ...libel." Id. at § 44; "LmL, WHAT. Libel
is a false and unprivileged publication by writing, printing, picture, effigy, or other fixed
representation to the eye, which exposes any person to hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy,
or which causes him to be shunned or avoided, or which has a tendency to injure him in his
occupation." Id.at § 45.
8. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1536 (brackets in original).
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official plaintiffs against defendants critical of the plaintiffs' official conduct.9 The Court held that for a plaintiff to win this type of libel case, the
plaintiff must prove that the defendant conveying the alleged libelous
statement did so with what the court termed "actual malice"-that is, the
defendant must have known that the statement was false when made, or
must have recklessly disregarded the statement's probable falsity.'0 The
Court further held that by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment the
actual malice standard applies to the states." Later, the Supreme Court
widened the application of the actual malice standard, holding that public
figures, in addition to public officials, must also prove a defendant's actual
2
malice in order to recover damages caused by libelous statements.'

9. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964). In New York Times the
United States Supreme Court considered a libel action brought against the New York Times
and four black Alabama clergymen whose names had appeared as signatories of a full page
advertisement in the newspaper. Id. at 256. The action was based upon claims and insinuations,
made in the advertisement, that Montgomery, Alabama police had "ringed" the campus of
Alabama State College and had padlocked its cafeteria after a campus civil rights protest. Id.
at 257. Additionally, the advertisement claimed that the police had arrested Dr. Martin Luther
King seven times and had tried to intimidate him with violence. Id. at 258. Although not
mentioned by name in the advertisement, the plaintiff claimed that the actions that the
advertisement had imputed to the police were also imputed to him as the Montgomery
Commissioner in charge of the police department. Id. at 256, 258. While the Court determined
that many of the allegations in the advertisement were not literally true, the Court also
concluded that none of the four individual defendants knew that their names had appeared
on the advertisement until the plaintiff demanded a retraction. Id. at 258-60. The Court also
established that while no New York Times, employee had made any attempt to check the
accuracy of the advertisement, none of the newspaper's personnel had believed that the facts
asserted in the advertisement were incorrect. Id. at 260.
The Court first held that libelous statements that would otherwise be constitutionally
protected do not lose that protection merely because the statements were presented in the form
of a paid advertisement. Id. at 266. Then, finding that the law of libel is not immune from
constitutional limitations, the Supreme Court held that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
prevent a public official from recovering damages for false and defamatory statements regarding
his official conduct unless he proves that the defendant published the statement with what the
court termed "actual malice." Id. at 269, 279-80. The Court defined actual malice as either
knowledge at the time of publication that the statement was false, or reckless disregard of its
probable falsity. Id. at 279-80. Finally, the court held that the proof offered to show the
defendants' actual malice lacked the convincing clarity required for constitutional questions
and therefore held that the defendants could not be held liable for damages. Id. at 285-86,
292.
10. Id. at 279-80. The Supreme Court justified the imposition of the actual malice
standard upon the common law of libel by arguing that public officials have an analogous
privilege for criticisms they make as part of their official duties. Id. at 282. To fail to give a
reciprocal right to the public, the Court reasoned, would be to unjustifiably prefer public
officials over those they purportedly serve. Id. at 282-83. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (emphasizing subjective nature of actual malice standard by restating
New York Times holding that evidence of mere investigatory failure is not sufficient to satisfy
actual malice standard); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (emphasizing subjective
nature of actual malice standard).
11. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283.
12. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967) (holding that parallels
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In New York Times the Supreme Court also held that libel plaintiffs
must show actual malice with convincing clarity. 13 The Supreme Court later
ruled that, even on a motion for summary judgment, a court must consider
whether, given the record before the court, a jury reasonably could find
4
clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.
Purporting to work within these constitutional parameters, the district
court in Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. granted the defendants'
motions for summary judgment. 5 The court stated that Masson had failed
to present clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.' 6 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first reviewed the state of the law regarding
actual malice in cases of misquotation. 17 The court concluded that it is
improper to infer actual malice from evidence that the defendant knowingly
had misquoted the plaintiff when the misquotation is either a rational
interpretation of the defendant's vague remarks, 8 or does not differ in
substantive content from the defendant's actual unambiguous remarks. 19

between libel actions involving public officials and those involving public figures dictate that
constitutional considerations be injected into latter type of action also); see also Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (explaining that public figures warrant less
constitutional protection from defamation because of their access to media and consequent
ability to counteract defamatory statements made by others). The Curtis court stated that the
term "public figures" includes those who are not public officials, but are nonetheless connected
with issues in which the public has a justified, important interest. Id. at 134. With respect to
libel cases, the term "public figure" has also been defined to include business people, artists,
athletes and persons who are otherwise well known because of who they are or what they
have done. BLACK's LAW DicTioNARY 1229 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Rosanova v. Playboy
Enterprises, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 444 (D.C. Ga. 1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1978)).
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 (defining public figures as those who have assumed prominent
roles in society and those who have associated themselves with public controversy in order to
influence resolution of controversy).
13. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 285-86.
14. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986).
15. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
aff'd, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991). The district court granted
defendants' partial summary judgment as to four of the alleged misquotations on August 19,
1986 and, pursuant to a second motion, granted summary judgment on the remaining eight
alleged misquotations in its published opinion of August 17, 1987. Id.
16. Id. at 1407. For summary judgment purposes, the Masson plaintiff conceded that
he was a public figure and would therefore have to prove that the defendants acted with actual
malice. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537.
17. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537-39. Reference in this note to misquotation and falsified
quotation means the practice of placing within quotation marks words that were not uttered
by the person to whom they are attributed, or of otherwise presenting them in a way that
indicates a verbatim transcription of the quoted individual's remarks. The terms misquotation
and falsified quotation do not refer to inaccurate paraphrases of speakers' statements.
18. Id. at 1539. The court's method of inquiry into whether the defendant's quotations
were rational interpretations of the plaintiff's ambiguous remarks will be referred to as the
rational interpretation test. See infra notes 80, 83-88 and accompanying text (discussing the
application of the rational interpretation test in Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc.,
833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987)).
19. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539. The court's method of inquiry into whether the defendant's
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Assuming for the purpose of the summary judgment motion that Malcolm
knowingly misquoted Masson, 20 the court then examined each of eleven
allegedly defamatory quotations to determine whether a jury reasonably
could find clear and convincing evidence that the defendants acted with
actual malice.2 1 In what the Ninth Circuit characterized as an actual malice
analysis, the court compared the substance of each of the alleged misquotations to the substance of remarks admittedly made by Masson during his

interviews with Malcolm.?2 The court reasoned that if the quotations from
Malcolm's article were substantively similar to comments actually made by
Masson, as a matter of law the plaintiff would be unable to prove that
Malcolm knew the quotations were false at the time of publication.23 For
each quotation, the court determined either that Malcolm had rationally
interpreted ambiguous statements, or that Malcolm had not changed the

substantive meaning of what Masson had said.

4

Consequently, the court

quotations differed in substantive content from the plaintiff's actual unambiguous remarksan inquiry undertaken for the purpose of determining whether the defendant acted with actual
malice-will be referred to as the substantive content test. See infra notes 81, 89-100 and
accompanying text (explaining and critiquing Ninth Circuit's use of Hotchner v. CastilloPuche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977), to support court's application
of substantive content test).
20. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537.
21. Id. at 1539-46. The United States Supreme Court has held that, as a matter of
federal constitutional law, de novo review on appeal is required for all libel cases. See Bose
Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 510-11 (1984) (holding New York
Times independent appellate review requirement to be rule of federal constitutional law); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) (stating that, in libel cases, appellate
court must independently review entire record to assure itself that judgment does not impermissibly intrude on field of free expression); see also Speer v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 828
F.2d 475, 476-77 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 970 (1988) (stressing appellate court's
obligation to ensure that plaintiff has clearly and convincingly proved that disputed publication
is not entitled to First Amendment protection); Bartimo v. Horsemen's Benevolent and
Protective Ass'n, 771 F.2d 894, 896-97 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1119 (1986)
(holding that, in libel action, appellate court has duty of independent review regardless of
whether trial court judgment is for alleged defamer or defamed).
22. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539-46. The court compared the quotations appearing in
Malcolm's article to tape recordings and typed copies of handwritten notes from Malcolm's
several interviews with Masson. Id. at 1537. In the Ninth Circuit's opinion, the court determined
that eight of the eleven alleged misquotations were so similar in what the court termed
"substantive" meaning to the statements admittedly made by Masson that, as a matter of
law, the plaintiff could not prove that Malcolm knew that the meanings of these quotations
were false. Id. at 1539-46. This test is similar to the doctrine of substantial truth, except that
the Ninth Circuit used its substantive content test to determine the existence of actual malice,
while courts apply the substantial truth doctrine only to determine whether there is an actionable
falsity. See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (explaining proper application of
substantial truth doctrine).
23. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1538-39. In comparing Malcolm's misquotations to Masson's
actual remarks, the court often drew from various parts of Malcolm's interviews with Masson
to find substantive remarks that Malcolm had condensed into one short statement. See id. at
1540 n.4, 1542, 1543-44 (exemplifying court's practice of drawing from entire interview
transcript to justify one misquotation). The court did not confine itself to matching Malcolm's
misquotations one-for-one with discrete comments made by Masson. Id.
24. Id. at 1539-46. With regard to only one of the alleged misquotations-the alleged
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concluded that Malcolm had not seriously doubted the truth of any of the
passages and, thus, did not possess the requisite actual malice to be held
accountable for libeling Masson.2
To many observers, the decision reached by the Ninth Circuit seemed
counterintuitive.2 Critics argued that the appellate court's approach would
allow the media to falsify quotations with impunity. 27 Indeed, on the surface,
Masson's outcome on appeal did seem to sanction deceptive journalistic
practices. If there is one sacred canon of the journalistic profession it is
that, aside from correcting syntax and eliminating unintended utterances, a
journalist must not alter the wording of a speaker's remarks, then publish

misquotation in which Malcolm claimed that Masson had said, "I was like an intellectual
gigolo"-the court invoked the incremental harm branch of the libel proof plaintiff doctrine.
Id. at 1541. The majority held that the remaining uncontested portion of Malcolm's article
made Masson seem so bombastic that the additional harm caused by'the "intellectual gigolo"
quotation was negligible. Id. Because of this and because the court deemed the substantive
content of the quotation to be unchanged from that of the original, the court held the quotation
to be nonactionable. Id. The Ninth Circuit gave no reason why the incremental harm doctrine
was invoked for this particular quotation, but was not used for any of the others.
Unlike the substantial truth doctrine, which requires that a false allegation be compared
with the truth regarding that allegation, the incremental harm doctrine requires that a contested
allegation be compared with allegations made in the uncontested remainder of a publication.
See Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 516 F. Supp. 742, 750-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(holding that magazine's false report regarding seatbelt safety of plaintiff's electric car was
not actionable in light of many other uncontested disparaging statements made about car in
same article). With Masson, the Ninth Circuit became the only federal court of appeals to
adopt the often criticized incremental harm doctrine. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1566 (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting). For a stinging critique of the doctrine by then-Judge Scalia, see Liberty Lobby,
Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568-69 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
25. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539-46. Before publication of the allegedly defamatory material,
Masson informed both The New Yorker and Knopf of the inaccuracy of the quotations. Id.
at 1537. The publishers chose to publish the quotes anyway. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit
held that neither The New Yorker nor Knopf could incur vicarious liability for Malcolm's
actions because Malcolm herself was not liable. Id. at 1546.
26. See, e.g., Sargeant, Get the Gist? Court Okays Rewritten Quotes, Titm, Dec. 1989,
at 19, 21 (quoting lawyer for various media concerns as saying that there is no First Amendment
right to fabricate or modify quotations); Rubin & Rawitch, JournalistsGet License to Misquote,
L.A. Daily J., Sept. 28, 1989, at 6 (opining that Ninth Circuit, by upholding summary
judgment, had stripped quotation marks of any meaning); Gilbert, Putting Words in the
Mouths of Interviewees, L.A. Daily J., Sept. 25, 1989, at 7 (predicting that Ninth Circuit's
Masson opinion would create injustice to reader and interviewee by destroying reporters'
incentive to quote accurately); Taylor, Janet Malcolm's License to Lie, Legal Times, Aug. 14,
1989, at 21 (warning that new constitutional right created by Ninth Circuit allowed reporter
to betray readers). But see White, In Defense of Poetic License, L.A. LAwYR, April 1990,
at 28 (criticizing Ninth Circuit for examining content of article instead of actions of Malcolm,
but supporting result as protective of poetic license).
27. See Rubin & Rawitch, supra note 26, at 6 (referring to Ninth Circuit's Masson
decision as license to misquote); Taylor, supra note 26, at 21 (opining that Ninth Circuit's
Masson ruling gave journalists First Amendment right to fictionalize quotations). But see
Gilbert, supra note 26, at 7 (stating that Ninth Circuit's Masson decision does not actually
sanction misquotation, but merely absolves journalists when misquotation is substantially same
as actual remarks or rational interpretation of those remarks).
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the altered remarks as a verbatim transcription of what the speaker said.3
However, journalistic canons notwithstanding, neither statutory nor common
law specifically forbids intentional misquotation of others. The lack of a
specific legal proscription on misquotation as such led the courts hearing
Masson to determine the defendants' liability for their misquotations according to the only body of law applicable within the context of Masson's
fact pattern-the law of defamation. 29 Unfortunately, until Masson postNew York Times case law did not directly address the propriety of basing
a finding of actual malice solely on the defendants' alleged knowledge that
the quotation in question was not a verbatim transcription of the words
uttered by the purported speaker.30
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the Ninth Circuit.3 The Supreme Court first recognized that a writer's
placement of quotation marks around a statement generally indicates that
the writer is reporting the speaker's words verbatim. 32 The Court further

28. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1553 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing J. HurLTENG, PLAYING
IT STRAIGrr: A PRACTICAL DIscussIoN OF THE ETmcAL PRiNCIPLES OF TE AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF NEW PAPER EDITORS 64 (1981)) (stating that creation of quotations is never justifiable even
if fabricated quotation is commensurate With speaker's personality); id. (citing J. HULTENG,
THE MESSENGER'S MOTVES: ETMUCAL PROBLEMS OF THE NEWs MEDIA 71 (1976)) (describing as
unethical practice of misquoting for purpose of altering reader's feelings regarding news figure
or situation); see also id. at 1550 n.3 (citing J. HuLTENG, THE MESSENGER'S MOTIvES: ETmcAL
PROBLEMS IN Tm NEWS MEDIA 74 (1976)) (regarding reporter's obligation not to alter essential
reality of someone's ideas when reporting on those ideas); id. at 1559 n.14 (citing Hersey, The
Legend on the License, YALE REv., Autumn 1980, at 1, 2) (stating that sacred rule of
journalism prohibits fictionalization).
29. See id. at 1537. Masson sued Malcolm for false light invasion of privacy as well as
for libel. Id. The elements of the false light tort, both common-law and constitutional, are
substantially analogous to those of the libel tort, although the false light action is designed to
compensate the plaintiff for injured feelings, as opposed to injured reputation. See Leidholdt
v. L.F.P. Inc., 860 F.2d 890, 893 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that false light tort is subject to
same limitations as libel action); R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS 393-401

(1980) (summarizing law of false light). The district court explicitly ruled that its holdings
regarding Masson's libel count also applied to Masson's false light count and summarily
dismissed the latter count along with the libel count. Masson, 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1407 & n.7
(N.D. Cal. 1987). The Ninth Circuit made no explicit ruling regarding the false light count,
but, presumably, the upholding of the dismissal of that count was subsumed in that of the
libel count.
30. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1537. In misquotation cases in which the judgment for the
plaintiff has been upheld, the courts were not faced with a situation in which the defendant
knew that a misquotation had occurred, yet still believed that the substantive content of the
quotations was accurate. In these cases, actual malice was established through the defendant's
knowledge that the premise behind the quotations, as well as the quotations themselves, had
been falsified. See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976) (establishing

actual malice through defendant's fabrication of quotations based upon occurrences at a
meeting that writer read about in another article); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61,
155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal. Ct. App.) (finding actual malice from defendant's complete fabrica-

tion-including fabrication of quotations-of occurrences at psychiatric group session), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
31. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (1991).

32. Id. at 2430.
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noted that within Malcolm's article, Malcolm provided no indication by
which a reasonable reader could discern that Malcolm's quoted attributions
to Masson were anything but verbatim. 3
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, defined the constitutional
question at issue to be whether, accepting Masson's accusations as true,
there existed sufficient evidence to indicate that Malcolm had acted with
actual malice.3 4 In approaching the question of the existence of actual
malice, the majority first examined the issue of what would constitute falsity
within the parameters of Masson's facts.35 Specifically, the Court questioned
whether Malcolm's attribution of words to Masson'that Masson did not
speak could comprise the falsity necessary for Masson to prove that Malcolm
acted with actual malice. 6 The majority rejected Masson's assertion that
any changes in excess of those for grammar and syntax
would constitute
37
falsity for purposes of an actual malice determination.
Opining that the principles underlying existing defamation law are
adequate to determine falsity in the context of quotations, the Court declined
to create any specific test for determining falsity of quotations. 3 Instead,
the majority applied the common-law substantial truth doctrine39 and held
that knowing alteration of a statement uttered by a speaker does not
constitute actual malice unless the alteration has materially changed the
meaning arising from the speaker's remarks. 4° Justice Kennedy further
explained that the false attribution of words to a speaker through use of
quotation marks is an important component of the actual malice inquiry,
but is not dispositive of the question in all cases. 41 The Supreme Court
recognized that the Ninth Circuit purported to apply the substantial truth
test, but criticized the Court of Appeals for finding Malcolm's misquotations
to be substantially true by virtue of the fact that the misquotations were
rational interpretations of remarks actually made by Masson. 42 Use of
quotation marks, Justice Kennedy reasoned, implies to the reader that the
writer has not interpreted the speaker's remarks, but has reported them
verbatim. 43 Therefore, any constitutional leeway which might exist for

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id.at 2431.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2431-32.
Id. at 2432.
See infra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (explaining substantial truth doctrine).
Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2433. The Court recognized that the "meaning" at issue

included not only the meaning of Masson's remarks themselves, but also the meaning that a
reader would attach to the manner in which Masson phrased a particular remark or to the
fact that Masson had made the remark at all. Id. at 2432.
41. Id. at 2433. Justice Kennedy wrote further that "[d]eliberate or reckless falsification

that comprises actual malice turns upon words and punctuation only because the words and
plinctuation express meaning." Id.
42. Id. at 2433-34.
43. Id. at 2434.
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interpretation is inapplicable to libel claims involving misquotation.After outlining the general rules of law to be applied to the facts at
hand, the Supreme Court reviewed each of the six claimed misquotations
which had reached the Supreme Court for review. 41 For all but one quotation, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's affirmation of summary
judgment against Masson. 46 The majority found that five of the misquotations differed materially from Masson's purported actual statements and
that, for each, a jury could find that the changes were libelous.47 The Court
then remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for further proceedings. 4
Justice White, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented from the majority's
holding that a misquotation should not be considered false unless the writer
has materially altered the meaning to be gleaned from the speaker's remarks. 49 Justice White stated that the traditional approach to libel cases
dictates that any knowing misquotation of Masson by Malcolm would
constitute the requisite knowledge of falsity for the misquotation to survive
summary judgment on the issue of actual malice.5 0 As a separate question
in ruling upon the propriety of summary judgment, Justice White continued,
the Court must consider whether a jury could find that the misquotation
actually libeled the speaker."' However, the latter determination should be
entirely separate from deciding whether there actually has been a knowing
falsification.5 2 Consequently, both Justices White and Scalia would have
reversed the Ninth Circuit's opinion as to all six of the contested quotations,
including the dismissal of the one quotation that the Supreme Court majority
opined was not materially altered.53
A thorough reading of the trial court, appellate court and Supreme
Court opinions reveals that the issues of defamation, falsity and actual
malice are more complicated than any of the courts admitted. 54 The opinion
rendered on appeal by the Ninth Circuit contains some especially glaring
oversights."s For example, the Ninth Circuit majority did not render an

44. Id.
45. Id. at 2434-37. Masson had appealed the district court's summary dismissal of claims
arising from eleven quotations to the Ninth Circuit. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,
Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1539-46 (9th Cir. 1989) (reviewing Masson's claims stemming from eleven
separate published quotations), rev'd, Ill S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
46. Masson, Ill S. Ct. at 2434-37.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 2437.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2437-38.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 2439.
54. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1987),
aff'd, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991) (revealing, through
comparison of decisions by each court, the complexity of the constitutional libel law issues
involved).
55. See Masson, 895 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1989) (comprising Ninth Circuit's appellate
decision).
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opinion as to whether Malcolm's misquotations were actually true or false
and it also did not address whether the changes that Malcolm made defamed
Masson.56 The court, relying on its case law analysis, merely decided that
Malcolm's misquotations were so similar in substance to remarks that
Masson had actually made during their interviews that Malcolm could not
have believed that what she was writing was false. 7 The Court of Appeals
did not adequately address Malcolm's knowledge that the quotations themselves, regardless of any similarity between their substance and the substance
words that Masson did not utter
of Masson's actual statements, contained
58
and at least in this respect were false.
Although in its opinion the Supreme Court addressed and rectified most
of the Ninth Circuit's oversights,5 9 the Court's opinion failed to specify
how evidence of a writer's knowledge of misquotation should be employed
in future misquotation libel cases. The Supreme Court held that a writer's
knowledge of the falsity of a quotation is an important factor in the actual
malice inquiry, but may not serve to establish actual malice in all cases. 60
However, the Court did not explain under what circumstances a writer's
knowledge of a quotation's false form should be dispositive of the actual
malice question. Neither did the Court opine specifically as to how this
type of knowledge should be employed in cases where the knowledge is not
dispositive.
An in-depth exploration of the constitutionally mandated connection
between knowledge, falsity and defamation required to establish the existence
of actual malice in a libel action renders a logical approach to use of
knowledge of misquotation in misquotation libel cases. As the Supreme
Court acknowledged, the defendant's knowledge of misquotation is too
strong an indication of culpability to be ignored. 61 This indication is strong
enough that knowledge of any misquotation should create a. rebuttable
presumption of actual malice in misquotation cases. 62 To understand the
reasoning behind this conclusion, one must grasp the connection between a

56. Id. at 1536-46. The Ninth Circuit never addressed the issue of whether any defamatory
falsity existed, but instead proceeded straight to the issue of actual malice. Id. Even on the
issue of actual malice, the majority dwelled only upon Malcolm's state of mind regarding the
substantive meaning of her misquotations-the court did not consider the effect of the
defendant's knowledge that the words within her quotations themselves were falsified. Id. See
supra text accompanying notes 17-25 (explaining Ninth Circuit's analytical approach to actual
malice question).
57. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539-44.
58. See id. passim. On appeal, it was assumed that Malcolm had deliberately altered the
quotations. Id. at 1537.
59. See supra notes 31-48 and accompanying text (describing Supreme Court's holdings
and reasoning in Masson).
60. Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2433.
61. Id.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 150-57 (detailing logical reasons for allowing
defendant's knowledge of misquotation to establish rebuttable presumption of actual malice).
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defendant's knowledge of a quotation's false form and the defamatory
effect inflicted by the quotation. 63 For example, in any type of libel case
involving a public figure as plaintiff, a defendant can be liable only if the
defendant defames the plaintiff through a false assertion published with

knowledge of or reckless disregard for the assertion's falsity.6 Therefore,
if a libel defendant knows that he has falsified the form of a quotation,
yet believes that he has faithfully conveyed the meaning intended by the

speaker, post-New York Times case law seems to dictate that the defendant
can be considered to have acted with actual malice only if the plaintiff was
defamed by the false form of the quotation and not merely by the substance

of the remarks. 65 Similarly, one must be able to identify those types of
cases in which such an exacting inquiry is unnecessary." As the Supreme
Court indicated, well-developed post-New York Times case law is more than
adequate to effectively adjudicate the full range of misquotation casescourts need not resort to the development of special rules for misquotation
cases.67

63. See infra text accompanying notes 142-54 (explaining possible connections between
quotation's false form and reputational harm inflicted by quotation).
64. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974).
65. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706-07 & n.7 (1990)
(explaining that falsity relevant to actual malice inquiry is only falsity relating to defamatory
aspects of statement). New York Times and its progeny dictate that there must be a congruence
between the defendant's knowledge of falsity and the false element, if any, that gives rise to
the defamation. See id. Therefore, if the defendant does not believe that the substance of a
misquotation is false-, post-New York Times case law seems to dictate that any reputational
harm arising from that substance is nonactionable for lack of actual malice.
The attempt to distinguish between form and substance is for analytical purposes and one
should not construe this attempt to imply that form and substance are totally separable.
Indeed, any change of wording within a quotation may change the explicit, implicit and
speaker-referential meanings of the quotation no matter how literally synonymous the misquotation appears to be to the original. See infra notes 129-36 and accompanying text (discussing
form/substance dichotomy and effect of formal change on meaning). Here, a misquotation
that is termed "false as to form only" is one that does not contain the precise words actually
uttered by the speaker, but that does relay the explicit,., apparently intended message of the
speaker-i.e., something that would be a valid paraphrase. A misquotation that is termed
"false as to substance" is one that changes the explicit, apparently intended meaning of the
speaker's actual comments. The latter category includes misquotations that are complete
fabrications.
66. See supra note 30 (citing Carson and Bindrim as examples of cases in which inquiry
into defendant's knowledge of misquotation was unnecessary); infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text (explaining, inter alia, that knowledge of misquotation was not crucial element
in actual malice analyses in Bindrim and Carson). Generally, in cases such as Bindrim v.
Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984
(1979), and Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (1976), in which the premise behind the
quotations is itself false, it would seem unnecessary to split the actual malice inquiry into
knowledge of form and knowledge of content, because knowledge of the false form would
necessarily be subsumed within the knowledge of the false premise.
67. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (1991) (asserting
that fundamental principles of defamation law are sufficient to cover cases of misquotation,
rendering creation of specific body of law for misquotation cases unnecessary). But see
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Before attempting to develop a rational general approach to misquotation cases, it is instructive to examine and critique the opinions rendered
in Masson. The Ninth Circuit's case law analysis is especially worth examining, both because it addresses the constitutional misquotation libel decisions rendered before Masson and because, through its misinterpretations
and oversights, it illustrates many of the pitfalls into which courts may
stumble in future misquotation cases.6 Misquotation case law to date, even
after the Supreme Court's Masson decision, has failed to develop into a
comprehensive approach that generally can be employed to decide misquotation cases. Specifically, the written opinions in each of the misquotation
tailored and
cases relied upon by the Ninth Circuit majority are narrowly
69
do not effectively translate from one case to another.
The Ninth Circuit relied on Bindrim v. MitchelP0 for the proposition
that the privilege to falsify quotations is not boundless.7 1 The Bindrim

Comment, FabricatedQuotations as Causefor Libel Recovery by a Public Figure, 57 U. Cm.
L. Rnv. 1353, 1384-85 (1990) (proposing that, in cases like Masson, plaintiff be required to
prove both knowledge of falsity and knowledge of defamatory effect before being able to
recover from defendant). Others have suggested that, as a general actual malice rule, all
plaintiffs should be required to prove that the defendant knew of the defamatory effect of
the publication at issue, in addition to knowing of its falsity. See Schauer, Language, Truth
and the First Amendment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. Rnv. 263, 28194 (1978) (suggesting that plaintiff be required to prove defendant knew of defamatory effect
of falsification to prove actual malice). However, such a rule has yet to be adopted by any
court. Until such a rule is adopted, there is no legitimate reason why such a standard should
be applied to misquotation cases while it is not applied to other types of libel cases. See infra
notes 142-55 and accompanying text (suggesting method for applying existing requirements for
actual malice to misquotation cases).
68. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d at 1537-39 (9th Cir. 1989)
(attempting to apply of four inapposite misquotation cases to Masson facts), rev'd, 11 S. Ct.
2419 (1991). The Ninth Circuit relied on four cases in its misquotation libel law analysis: Dunn
v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987); Hotchner v. CastilloPuche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977); Carson, 529 F.2d 206;
Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29. Before Masson, this was the extent of directly
relevant post-New York Times case law on the subject of libel actions based upon misquotation
brought by public figures.
69. See infra notes 70-100 and accompanying text (discussing Masson court's reliance on
four inapposite misquotation cases).
70. 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal. Ct. Api;.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984
(1979). In Bindrim, the California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court verdict that an
author and a publisher had defamed the plaintiff in a novel by portraying the plaintiff as
obscene and demanding with his patients. Id. at 82, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 41. The plaintiff, a
psychologist who used a so-called "nude marathon"-a type of nude encounter session-for
group therapy, sued the author and the publisher of a novel about a psychiatrist who also
employed nude marathons as part of his therapeutic repertoire. Id. at 69-70, 155 Cal. Rptr.
at 33-34. The plaintiff complained, inter alia, that he was libeled by a passage in the novel in
which the fictional doctor insensitively and profanely attempted to persuade a clergyman to
bring his wife to the nude marathon. Id. at 70, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34. The Court of Appeal,
noting that the defendant author had herself attended one of the plaintiff's nude marathons
and knew that the literary portrayal of the event was inaccurate, upheld the jury's finding
that the defendant had acted with the requisite actual malice. Id. at 72-73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at
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court, before finding that supposed fictional characters in a novel written
by the defendant were identifiable as the plaintiff psychiatrist and his
patients, 72 found that the defendants knew that neither the plaintiff nor his
patients had ever uttered quoted statements attributed to the fictional
characters. 73 However, the court did not find it necessary to consider the
effect of the misquotations separately from what the court characterized as
the defendant's substantially inaccurate and defamatory description of the
events that transpired at the nude encounter session being run by the
plaintiff, at which the statements were purportedly made. 74 The Bindrim

opinion's lack of concentration on the misquotations indicates that the court
would have found the defendant's published statements to be false and
75
defamatory regardless of the presence of misquotations.
Similarly, in Carson v. Allied News Co.,76 the court found that the
defendant newspaper reporter had completely fabricated a story about

35. The court further held that because the defendant publisher was on notice that the character
in the novel might actually refer to the plaintiff and that the descriptions of events in the
novel were inaccurate, the defendant publisher had published the paperback version of the
novel with actual malice. Id. at 74, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 36. The court rejected the defendants'
contention that the fictional psychiatrist could not be identified as the plaintiff, pointing out
that transcripts of the encounter session attended by the defendant author closely paralleled
the narrative in the novel. Id. at 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38. Finally, in upholding the jury's
verdict, the Bindrim court opined that the jury was entitled to decide whether a reader
identifying the fictional doctor with the plaintiff would interpret the damaging passages as
fiction, or as an accurate reflection of actions taken by the plaintiff. Id. at 78, 155 Cal. Rptr.
at 39.
71. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539. The Masson court did not render an opinion as to what
should be the bounds of the privilege.
72. Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 75-76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38.
73. Id. at 72-73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35-36.
74. Id. at 77, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
75. See id. at 72-73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (holding merely that defendant's reckless
disregard for truth was established because she knew what transpired at encounter session,
and must have known that her literary portrayals were different).
76. 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976). In Carson, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant newspaper which
had printed a story, including purported quotations of the plaintiff television personality,
alleging that the plaintiff had dishonorable motives for moving the broadcast location of his
television program from New York to California. Id. at 208, 214. The defendant, publisher
of the tabloid National Insider, published an article alleging that plaintiff Carson wanted to
move his Tonight Show from New York to Hollywood to be near his soon-to-be second wife,
Joanna Holland-also a plaintiff-who, the newspaper claimed, had broken up Carson's first
marriage. Id. at 208. Plaintiffs conceded that they both were public figures and asserted that
Holland had never lived in California until a few weeks before her marriage to Carson and
that Carson had not met Holland until several months after his separation from his first wife.
Id. at 211. The defendants claimed that the reporter who wrote the story based his facts upon
an article that had appeared several weeks earlier in a Chicago newspaper. Id. The court
found that the defendant had failed to disclose any source from which it might have learned
that Holland broke up Carson's first marriage. Id. at 212. In addition, the writer of the story
disclosed that he simply had fabricated a purported conversation between Carson and network
executives "as a logical extension" of occurrences described in the earlier Chicago article. Id.
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television personality Johnny Carson's purportedly selfish and unjustifiable
reasons for moving the broadcast location of his Tonight Show from New
York to California. 77 The Ninth Circuit cited Carson for the proposition
that a court may infer actual malice from a misquotation when the misquoted statement is wholly the product of the author's imagination. 7
However, as in Bindrim, because the premise behind the falsified quotations
was itself defamatory and originated entirely in the defendant's imagination,
the court found it unnecessary to opine as to the separate reputational
harm, if any, caused by the defamatory quotations attributed directly to
79
plaintiff Carson.
While the Ninth Circuit merely drew vague conclusions from Bindrim
and Carson, the court relied heavily on Dunn v. Gannett New York
Newspapers, Inc.S0 and Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche' in formulating the two

212-13. The Carson court held that, because of the foregoing established falsifications, the
plaintiffs were entitled to a jury determination on the existence of actual malice. Id. at 213.
Based upon the record, the court believed that the jury reasonably could decide that the
defendant had acted with actual malice. Id.
77. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 210-13 (7th Cir. 1976).
78. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1539 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd,
Ill S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
79. See Carson, 529 F.2d at 213 (holding that plaintiff was entitled to jury determination
regarding actual malice based both upon accusations that plaintiff was marriage breaker and
upon defendant's fabricated recounting of remarks made by plaintiff).
80. 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987). In Dunn, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court's summary judgment in favor of the defendant newspaper publisher who,
the plaintiff mayor claimed, libeled the plaintiff by inaccurately translating remarks the plaintiff
had made regarding the city's Hispanic population. Id. at 452. The defendant's Spanish
language newspaper had covered a campaign debate in which the mayor of Elizabeth, New
Jersey implied that foreigners moving into Elizabeth who had not yet been assimilated into
American culture might be partly responsible for the city's litter problem. Id. at 448. Several
days later, a headline appeared in the newspaper reading, in Spanish, "Elizabeth Mayor on
the attack: CALLS HISPANICS 'PIGS."' Id. The plaintiff brought a libel suit based upon
this headline and upon a subsequently published open letter to the plaintiff which compared
the plaintiff to Adolf Hitler and Fidel Castro. Id. at 448, 453-54. Referring to the Spanish
word "cerdos"-in English, "pig"-as a "fair, albeit inadequate, translation" of "litterbug,"
the court held that the defendant's mischaracterization of the plaintiff's remarks was not
sufficient ground to hold the newspaper liable under the New York Times actual malice
standard. Id. at 452. Additionally, the court also held that the open letter published by the
defendant constituted pure opinion and, therefore, was protected absolutely by the First
Amendment. Id. at 454-55.
81. 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977). In Hotchner, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a libel judgment against a defendant who had
published a book containing several defamatory remarks about the plaintiff. Id. at 914.
Plaintiff Hotchner, a successful writer and friend of the late Ernest Hemingway, brought suit
against the defendant publisher Doubleday & Co., charging that Hotchner had been libeled
by several comments appearing in Doubleday's English translation of Jose Luis Castillo-Puche's
Spanish language memoir of Hemingway. Id. at 911. In his book, Castillo-Puche made several
unflattering remarks about Hotchner and also attributed to Hemingway at least one equally
unflattering remark regarding Hotchner. Id. at 911-12. Regarding Castillo-Puche's opinions,
the court held that Doubleday could not be liable because, based upon the author's reputation
and photographs of the author with Hotchner, Doubleday had good reason to believe that
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specific actual malice tests the court employed in its analysis.2 In Dunn the

plaintiff mayor sued a Spanish language newspaper for improperly translating plaintiff's English language remarks as referring to local Hispanics
as "cerdos"-a Spanish word meaning "pigs"-when the plaintiff had

actually implied the word "litterbug." 3 The Dunn court, recognizing that
there is no exact Spanish equivalent for the English word "litterbug," held

that the plaintiff had failed to produce evidence to show that the translation
was not a fair one. 84 The court held that because no reasonable jury could
find actual malice with convincing clarity, summary judgment in favor of
the defendant was proper."s It was from Dunn that the Ninth Circuit gleaned
the proposition that courts should not infer actual malice from a defendant's
knowing misquotation of a plaintiff if the falsified quotations are rational
interpretations of ambiguous comments made by the plaintiff.8 6 However,
in Dunn because the plaintiff's remarks required translation, a verbatim
quotation would have been impossible. Unlike the case in Masson, the
Dunn defendant had no choice but to interpret the plaintiffs remarks
regardless .of whether he chose to quote or paraphrase the plaintiff."
Consequently, the defendant properly benefitted from the constitutionally
mandated margin for error in judging the most accurate way to reflect the
plaintiffs remarks. 8

Castillo-Puche had based his opinions on first hand knowledge about Hotchner. Id. at 91314. Finally, regarding the remarks that Castillo-Puche had attributed to Hemingway, the
Hotchner court ruled that although Doubleday had altered the remarks from the version
provided by Castillo-Puche, the publisher's alterations neither changed the subject matter nor
increased the defamatory content of the remarks as originally submitted by Castillo-Puche.
Id. at 914. Because of this, the court ruled that Doubleday did not act with actual malice
and, therefore, was not liable for publication of the statement. Id.
82. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539 (describing the conclusions drawn from Dunn and
Hotchner); see also supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit's
application of rational interpretation and substantive content tests).
83. Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446, 447-48 (3d Cir. 1987).
84. Id. at 452.
85. Id.
86. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1539.
87. See id. at 1555 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that translation necessarily entails
judgment, while no judgment is required to quote an English-speaking person in English); see
also Washington Post, Nov. 19, 1990, at D3, col. 3. (detailing comments by United States
State Department translator regarding difficulties in retaining nuances of meaning when
translating from one language to another). Regarding translations from one language to
another, Alexis Oblensky, Chief of the United States State Department's Russian translation
section and United States supervisor of translation for the Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe, said, "No language is translatable verbatim into another language. And
therefore when one deals with [translation], the problem that arises ... is how to give as
close a possible verbatim version of the other language texts without biasing the substance
and the sense." Id. (ellipses in original).
In addition to the fact that translation was necessary in Dunn, whether the use of
quotation marks in the contested newspaper headline was meant to denote a verbatim quotation
or simply to indicate that the word "cerdos" was being used figuratively was unclear. Dunn,
833 F.2d at 451.
88. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2433-34 (1991) (citing
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Hotchner is the misquotation case that is most factually similar to
Masson.8 9 In Hotchner the court found that the defendant publishers knowingly had changed the wording of a quotation purportedly made by the late
Ernest Hemingway about the plaintiff from .".[Hotchner is] dirty and a
terrible ass-licker. There's something phony about him. I wouldn't sleep in
the same room with him,"' to the milder "'I don't trust him." '90 Although
the court also found the misquotation to be defamatory, it held that the
knowingly falsified quotation was not actionable because the falsification
did not increase the defamatory impact that Hemingway's actual quotation
otherwise would have had. 91 In fact, by bowdlerizing Hemingway's original

bawdy quotation, the defendants made it markedly less defamatory of the
plaintiff.9
The Ninth Circuit drew heavily upon the Hotchner court's holding that
the defendants could not be held liable for their knowing alteration of
Hemingway's quotation because "the change did not increase the defamatory
impact or alter the substantive content" of the original remarks. 93 The
appellate majority chose to read the foregoing Hotchner clauses disjunctively, believing that the Second Circuit had intended to create in that case
two separate mechanisms for absolving defendants in misquotation cases. 4
The Ninth Circuit cited Hotchner for the proposition that writers are free
to fictionalize quotations so long as they do not 'alter the substantive
content' of the speaker's remarks, ignoring the first part of the Hotchner

holding regarding differences in defamatory impact. 95
Because the Hotchner court disposed of the plaintiff's misquotation
claim in less than one hundred words, citing no authority, it is not clear
whether that court intended its holding always to be read as a whole, or
whether the court believed the elements of the holding could be employed

Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971) & Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984)) (describing proper application of rational interpretation standard
and declining to apply standard to case at bar).
89. See Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 834 (1977) (explaining that defendants knew that they had altered third party's quotation,
but did not believe they had changed quotation's substance). Hotchner is in one sense the case
most relevant to the Masson situation in that the defendants in Hotchner altered a quotation,
but did not believe that they had changed the substantive meaning of the quotation. Id.
However, Hotchner is also significantly different from Masson in that Hotchner involved the
misquotation of a third party regarding the plaintiff (third person misquotation case), id.,
whereas Masson involved the misquotation of the plaintiff himself (first person misquotation
case). Masson, 895 F.2d at 1536. See infra note 122 (contrasting elements of first and third
person misquotation cases).
90. Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1538 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd,
IlI S. Ct. 2419 (1991). See Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914 (holding that defendants could not be
liable because they neither increased defamatory impact, nor changed substantive content of
speaker's actual remarks).
94. See Masson, 895 F.2d at 1538, 1539 (drawing conclusion that defendant is absolved
if she believed merely that she did not change substantive content of plaintiff's remarks).
95. See id. at 1539 (quoting Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914).

1456
separately.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
6

[Vol. 48:1441

However, if one assumes that a federal court of appeals would

not formulate a special new actual malice test without more thoroughly
explaining itself, it is most consistent with existing libel law to read "or

alter the substantive content" as a mere qualifier of the clause "did not
increase the defamatory impact" and not as an alternative criterion for
excusing defendants from liability. If read this way, the Hotchner analysis
is merely a restatement of existing libel law: defendants may only be liable
for defaming a plaintiff when the plaintiff is actually defamed by the
defendants' falsification.Y
This reading first provides that a falsification of a quotation by a
defendant cannot be actionable if it does not add to the defamatory impact
of the original statement. This is then qualified by the "substantive content"
provision: that even if the falsification does not increase the defamatory

impact of the statement, the change can still be actionable if the change
gives rise to a wholly different defamatory meaning, whether more or less

severe than that of the original statement. 98 In other words, if the Hotchner

defendants had changed Hemingway's remark to read, "I think Hotchner
is a very poor writer," they would have been liable for their falsification
despite the fact that the defamatory sting of the latter statement may be
no greater than that of Hemingway's calling Hotchner "phony" and "a

terrible ass-licker." The Second Circuit seemed to be ensuring explicitly that
its opinion could not be read to imply that a publisher is free to publish a
false quotation that defames the plaintiff in a manner entirely different
than would the plaintiff's actual statement so long as the misquotation is
less defamatory of the plaintiff than the plaintiff's actual statement. 99 The
Hotchnercourt squarely and properly based its decision summarily to dismiss

96. See Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914 (disposing of misquotation claim in less than 100
words). The Hotchner court's entire analysis concerning the misquotation consisted of the
following:
Appellee contends that [the defendant] should be liable simply because it knowingly
published a bowdlerized version of Hemingway's alleged statement. We disagree. It
is true that in transforming Hemingway's words to the much milder "I don't trust
him," [the defendant] was fictionalizing to some extent. However, the change did
not increase the defamatory impact or alter the substantive content of Hemingway's
statement about [the plaintiff]. If [the defendant] could not have been liable for
publishing the uncut version, it cannot be liable for deciding to make the passage
less offensive to [the plaintiff].
Id. This indicates that the Second Circuit's decision revolved around the fact that the falsity
was not defamatory, and was not based solely upon the raw fact that the defendants had not
altered the quotation's substantive content.
97. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706 n.7 (1990) (noting that
falsity issue relates only to defamatory facts within statement).
98. The phrase "the change did not increase the defamatory impact or alter the substantive content," Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914, is most reasonably interpreted as an indivisible
whole and not as an either/or proposition.
99. See REsTATEmENT (SEcoNrD) OF ToRTs § 581A comment f (1977) (calling fact that
plalntiff undertook actions different from, but at least as reprehensible as actions alleged in
contested publication insufficient to absolve defendant of liability).
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the plaintiff's suit on the fact that the only defamatory impact arising from
the contested quotation came from the substantive residue of Hemingway's
actual remarks, not from the falsification in which defendants engaged. 100
The two main actual malice tests employed by the Ninth Circuit-the
rational interpretation test drawn from Dunn'0' and the substantive content
test gleaned from Hotchner02-merely clouded the issue of whether the
defendant knowingly published a defamatory falsity. As in any other type
of libel case, a court entertaining a libel suit brought by a public figure
and based upon misquotation should first determine whether the elements
of a libel action exist-that is, whether there is an actionable defamatory
falsity concerning the plaintiff, published with actual malice by the defendant.103 Misquotation cases may possess unique and difficult elements which
need to be addressed, but once these elements are understood it becomes
easier to fit the spectrum of misquotation cases within the general analytical
framework that has been developed since New York Times. 4
Because many of the elements of misquotation libel cases are ambiguous,
functionally overlapping and situation-dependent, a hypothetical is useful
to evaluate the logic and practical applicability of the proposed analysis, as
well as to make the analysis clearer. In the hypothetical, reporters question
P, the president of a large corporation often criticized for its poor record
in hiring and promoting women, regarding P's failure to promote mid-level
manager F, a female, into a vacant vice-presidency of the corporation. The
entire interview consists of the following exchange:
PresidentP: While the directors highly value the contribution F has
made to the corporation, I simply do not believe that women like
F are sufficiently tough to handle the complex responsibilities of
the position.
Reporter: Does the fact that F refused your sexual advances have
anything to do with the decision?
PresidentP: That question does not merit a response. Thank you,
now I have a plane to catch.
The following day, coverage of the comments appears in the city's four
newspapers. Unfortunately, none of the quotations of P are entirely accurate. The accounts are as follows:

100. See Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914 (holding defendants not liable because they neither
increased defamatory impact, nor changed substantive content of speaker's original remarks).
101. Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987). See
supra notes 80, 82-88 and accompanying text (discussing Ninth Circuit's application of rational
interpretation test from Dunn).
102. Hotchner, 551 F.2d 910. See supra notes 81, 89-100 and accompanying text (explaining
and critiquing Ninth Circuit's use of Hotchner to support court's application of substantive
content test).
103. Old Dominion v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284 (1974).
104. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2432 (1991) (stating
that existing principles of libel law are sufficient to decide cases of misquotation and, therefore,
declining to create specific actual malice test for such cases).
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Newspaper #1: When asked about the corporation's failure to
promote F, P replied, "I feel that females of F's ilk are not
tenacious enough to successfully undertake the difficult tasks that
the job entails."
Newspaper #2: When asked about the corporation's failure to
promote F, P replied, "I instead am considering making her the
manager of our low pressure Phoenix operation, to which I think
a woman like F would be best suited."
Newspaper #3: When asked about the corporation's failure to
promote F, P replied, "I think little fillies like her are just too
damned cute and fragile to be successful in a big, scary job like
that."
Newspaper #4: When asked about the corporation's failure to
promote F, P replied, "Any woman who refuses me should not
expect a promotion any time soon."
After seeing these fractured versions of his interview, P is quite angry and
sues all four newspapers for libel. The attribution- of all four printed
quotations appears to be injurious to P's reputation, albeit in different
ways. 03 In addition, all four versioins above purport to quote P directly,
but none of them is accurate. How should a court respond to each case?
A court's primary task after establishing that the defendant has published material that is prima facie injurious to a plaintiff's reputation is to
determine whether an actionable portion of defamation arises from a false
assertion. 1 Sometimes determining whether injury arises from falsity is not
difficult. A court does not need to surgically explore the genesis of the
falsity if the truth regarding the subject matter of the false and defamatory
allegation would not be at all injurious to the plaintiff's reputation.' 7 Even
in cases where the truth regarding the allegation is itself harmful to the
plaintiff's reputation, if the true and false elements of the published assertion
are discrete, a court also can determine whether the injury arises from a
falsity with relative ease."°8 The most difficult cases are those in which

105. See infra text accompanying notes 119-40 (discussing, inter alia, possible defamatory
implications arising from each hypothetical misquotation).
106. See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 59 (1989) (explaining that existing case law prohibits recovery for defamation unless
publication contains a defamatory statement of false fact).
107. See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976) (involving, inter alia,
completely fabricated story about television personality's marital arrangements). As an example
of a total fabrication, if a newspaper reported, "K (a prominent politician) smoked crack
cocaine at the Hilton Hotel," when K actually had never smoked crack at all, the fact that
the defamation of K arises from the false claim that K smoked crack would be readily apparent.
108. See Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super 420, 431-32, 138 A.2d
61, 68-69 (holding that newspaper's misidentification of local labor union chapter to which
plaintiff belonged was immaterial to libel claim that plaintiff had attended national labor
conventions without proper credentials). As an example of a story in which true and false
elements are easily separable, if politician K actually had smoked crack at the Ritz Hotel, but
a newspaper reported that "K was seen smoking crack at the Hilton," the only falsity contained
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defamation does arise from a false element of the contested publication,
yet the truth regarding the same element would also damage the plaintiff

to some degree. 1' 9 Both Masson and misquotations #3 and #4 of the
hypothetical are representative of the latter type of case. In all three, the
speaker's original remarks, if published, might have injured his reputation,
but the publisher's falsifications increased the harmful effects of the comments." 10 Because the change of a single word in a quotation may alter the

connotative meaning of the formally accurate phrasing around the word,
separating what is true, false, defamatory and nondefamatory into discrete
elements can be difficult in a misquotation case. As the Supreme Court

majority in Masson recognized,"' a misquotation case is a prime opportunity
for the application of the common-law substantial truth doctrine, which
provides that when the defamatory effect produced by a false statement is

in the newspaper's publication would be the claim that K had been at the Hilton, not at the
Ritz, while smoking crack. Although an element of the newspaper's allegation is false, the
defamation does not arise from the falsity because K would suffer the same damage to his
reputation no matter which hotel he was alleged to have been in while smoking crack.
Therefore, despite the falsification, the newspaper cannot be liable for any reputational harm
inflicted on the plaintiff by the published material.
109. See Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating
that plaintiff can still be defamed by falsity even if truth regarding matter also would be
injurious to plaintiff, but that, at certain point, incremental falsity becomes nonactionable),
rev'd on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1986). As an example of a story in which the true and
false versions would both be defamatory, if a newspaper reports that K was seen on the street
purchasing three grams of cocaine when K actually purchased only two grams of cocaine, the
false allegation probably is not actionable because the overriding defamatory impact of the
statement-that K purchased illegal narcotics from a street peddler-is true. On the other
hand, if the newspaper reports that K was seen selling two grams of cocaine when, in fact, K
actually purchased two grams of cocaine, the falsification probably would be actionable. In
the latter instance, K, in truth, had purchased illegal narcotics, while the false allegation led
the reading public to believe that K was a street peddler of narcotics-in our society a
qualitatively worse attribution.
110. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1564 (9th Cir. 1989)
(Kozinski, J. dissenting) (comparing Masson's actual disdainful remarks about Freud with
possibly stronger remarks about Freud attributed to Masson by Malcolm), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
2419 (1991); infra text accompanying notes 128-40 (discussing difference between reputationally
harmful effects of actual statement in hypothetical with harmful effects inflicted by misquotations #3 and #4).
111. See Masson, 111 S. Ct. at 2432-33 (employing doctrine of substantial truth to facts
of case). Justices White and Scalia overlook the traditional role of the substantial truth doctrine
in their dissent from the majority's holding that a knowing alteration of a speaker's statement
does not constitute actual malice unless the alteration causes a material change in the meaning
arising from the statement. These Justices claim that, in deciding a summary judgment motion,
any quotation which contains words that the speaker did not utter should be deemed false,
and that whether the falsity gives rise to an actionable libel should be a separate inquiry. Id.
at 2438 (White, J., dissenting in part). However, the substantial truth doctrine provides that
if an assertion is essentially true in its defamatory implication, then the assertion is not to be
considered false for purposes of a libel action arising from the assertion. See infra notes 11318 and accompanying text (explaining substantial truth doctrine). Thus, the doctrine precludes
a court from considering a quotation to be false in the libel sense unless attribution of the
altered quotation is more libelous than, or libelous in a different way than attribution of the
correct quotation would be.
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not more than negligibly different in degree or subject matter from the
defamatory effect that would arise from the truth relating to the allegation,
n2
then the statement, although defamatory, is nonactionable.
In libel actions, courts often invoke the platitude that truth is an
absolute defense to libel," 3 but also that a publication need not be literally
true for a publisher to escape liability-the publication: need only be "substantially true.""14 This doctrine of substantial truth is deceptive in name
because a publication may be fraught with falsifications, intentional or not,
yet a defendant can be liable only if an actionable amount of reputational
harm to the plaintiff actually arises from a falsification-otherwise, the
plaintiff can have no cause of action for libel.' As courts often explain,

112. RESTATmET (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 581A comment f (1977). "It is not enough that
the accused person is found to have engaged in some other substantially different kind of
misconduct, even though it is equally or more reprehensible." Id. See Aids Counseling and
Testing Centers v. Group W Television, Inc., 903 F.2d 1000, 1004 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding
that if what court termed as statement's "gist" or "sting" is substantially true, minor
inaccuracies will not support libel action).
113. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 767 (1986) (describing Pennsylvania law to be that truth is absolute defense); Guccione v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding proposition that truth is absolute defense to
libel to be fundamental under New York law), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987); Hoffman
v. Washington Post Co., 433 F. Supp. 600, 600 (D.D.C. 1977) (asserting that truth is complete
defense to libel action), aff'd, 578 F.2d 442 (1978); Kemper v. American Broadcasting Cos.,
365 F.Supp. 1275, 1276-77 (S.D. Ohio 1973) (holding that in Ohio truth is complete defense
to libel action); Gantry Constr. Co. v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 186,
122 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1975) (calling idea that truth is complete defense to libel fundamental);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A (1977) (stating that publisher of defamatory
statement of fact is not liable for defamation if statement is true).
114. See, e.g., Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 800 F.2d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that if alleged defamatory statement is substantially true, action must be dismissed,
regardless of injury to plaintiff's reputation); Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 623
F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that, under California law, defendant can defeat libel
suit by proving that implication of allegedly defamatory publication is substantially true), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 569 F.2d 459, 465-66 (9th Cir.
1977) (same).
The substantial truth doctrine is a common-law creation which originated when truth was
always a defense to libel. See R. SACK, supra note 29, at 39 n.27. In Hepps, the Supreme
Court made explicit that public figure libel plaintiffs are now constitutionally required to prove
that an allegedly defamatory statement is false in order to recover damages. 475 U.S. at 777.
However, although the burden of proof has shifted, courts still use the substantial truth
doctrine in determining whether a statement is actionably false and defamatory. See Schiavone
Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that truth must be
as broad as defamatory sting to preclude libel action); Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc. 814
F.2d 1066, 1073 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that publication is to be considered substantially true
if its gist or sting is true); see also Note, Libel Proof Plaintiffs-Rabble Without A Cause,
67 B.U.L. REv. 993, 1015 (1987) (summarizing substantial truth doctrine).
115. See Aids Counseling and Testing Centers v. Group W Television, Inc., 903 F.2d
1000, 1004 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs may not recover in libel by combining harm
arising from true statements with falsity of separate, immaterial statements); RESTATEmENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment f (calling establishment of literal truth unnecessary to
defend against libel action if substance of defamatory charge is true).
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this is because a publication is to be considered substantially true if the
"gist" or "sting" of the published defamation is true." 6 Essentially, the
core purpose of the substantial truth doctrine is simply to discern whether
the defamatory effect of a contested statement arises overwhelmingly from
a gleam of truth shining through any falsity, or whether the falsity super1 17
imposed upon the truth also contributes an actionable injurious effect.
The complexities of the substantial truth doctrine should not obscure that
the doctrine is merely one way of describing the court's essential responsibilities to determine from where within a publication'18 defamation is coming
and to determine whether the source of that defamation is false.
Applying the substantial truth test to the hypothetical, if one compares
newspaper #1's quotation word-for-word with P's actual statement, the
published quotation seems almost totally false. On a strictly quantitative
basis, only seven of the twenty-one words in newspaper #1's quotation are
in P's actual statement. As a reflection of the audible sounds that wafted
from P's mouth, then, version #1 fails miserably. On the other hand, if
one focuses on the substantive meanings-the meaning seemingly intended
by the speaker-of the two quotations, one could conclude that newspaper
#1's summary of P's remarks is accurate-that is, each would make a
perfectly acceptable paraphrase of the other. However, in applying the
substantial truth doctrine to misquotation cases, one should not merely
compare the meaning of the misquotation with the meaning of the actual
remarks. Instead, one should put primary emphasis on comparing the
injurious implications of the defamatory allegation with the implications
that would arise from the truth regarding that allegation." 9 In misquotation
cases, the defamatory allegation usually is not the misquotation itself, but
the attribution of the misquotation to the speaker. 20
116. See, e.g., Group W, 903 F.2d at 1004 (asserting that minor inaccuracies will not
support defamation claim if gist or sting of published statement is true); Schiavone Constr.
Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that truth must be as broad
as defamatory sting to preclude libel action); Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d
1066, 1073 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that publication is to be considered substantially true if its
gist or sting is true); Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir.
1980) (stating that statement is substantially true if gist or sting of publication is true).
117. See Guccione, 800 F.2d at 301-02 (approving trial court jury charge defining substantial truth test as whether published statement had different impact on mind of reader than
literal truth).
118. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1228 (6th ed. 1990) (defining publication in libel
sense). The noun "publication" as used here refers to any material published in the libel sense
in that it is transmitted from one person to another. The word is not meant to apply exclusively
to mass media, although this may be the most common usage.
119. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (explaining that substantial truth
doctrine involves truth of defamatory implications).
120. See Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspapers, Inc., 833 F.2d 446, 447 (3d Cir. 1987)
(describing purported libel at issue to be attribution of remarks to plaintiff, not the remarks
themselves); Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 71, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 35 (Cal. Ct.
App.) (characterizing purported libel in question to be not quotations themselves, but suggestion, through quotations, that plaintiff used obscene language), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984
(1979).
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When a publisher quotes an individual, that publisher essentially is
claiming that the individual engaged in a particular action-the articulation
of a specified group of words. Uttering a statement, after all, is an act in
a similar sense to that of robbing a bank, eating a bowl of spaghetti,
accepting a bribe, or evert thinking a thought. 12 1 In a libel case in which
the defendant effects a defamation by attributing a certain act to the
plaintiff, the defamatory harm to the plaintiff would stem from the public's
assessment of the plaintiff's character as evidenced by the action that he is
purported to have performed. Likewise, in most imaginable misquotation
cases involving misquotation of the plaintiff himself, the defamatory allegation would be the defendant's claim that the plaintiff executed a certain
act-that of speaking particular words.22 While the Supreme Court recognized that the attribution of the misquotation-not the misquotation itselfwas the relevant defamatory assertion,123 the Ninth Circuit majority failed
to realize this. Therefore, the appellate court mistakenly compared the
substantive meaning of Malcolm's misquotations to the meanings of Masson's actual remarks.' 24 Instead, the court should have compared the defam-

121. See S. LrTmrxoH,

TsmsomS oF HurmAN CommUNICATiON 105 (1983) (stating that to

speak is to perform an act). "When one speaks, one performs an act. The act may involve
stating, questioning, commanding, promising, or any of a number of other acts." Id.
122. For example, in cases in which the plaintiff himself has been misquoted, the
defamatory assertion would take the form "P said, 'XYZ."' See Dunn v. Gannett New York
Newspapers, 833 F.2d 446, 447-48 (3d Cir. 1987) (considering newspaper's allegation that
"[plaintiff] calls Hispanics 'pigs"' to be purportedly defamatory assertion at issue).. "XYZ"
itself usually would not be the defamatory assertion, except in the case that P might be quoted
as saying something like, "I, P, am an axe murderer." The statement itself then might be
considered to be the defamatory assertion, although the attribution of such a statement to P
would also be a defamatory assertion with two implications: (1) that P is an axe murderer;
and (2) that P is anxious to let others know he is an axe murderer.
Conversely, in most imaginable cases where a third person has been misquoted regarding
the plaintiff, the defamatory assertion is the quoted statement itself, because the assertion
usually would be merely a republication of injurious remarks made about the plaintiff. For
example, if a publisher writes, "T claims, 'P robbed me blind with his insurance scam,"' it
is "P robbed [T] blind with his insurance scam" that is the defamatory assertion-not the
attribution of that remark to T. Of course, in certain circumstances, the attribution of the
remark-especially if it expresses an opinion-to a particular third person could be considered
to be itself the defamatory assertion. For example, in Hotchner the defendants published, in
essence, the assertion: Hemingway said, "I don't trust the plaintiff." Hotchner v. CastilloPuche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977). Here, the claim that
someone does not trust the plaintiff is not the only element defamatory of the plaintiff.
Presumably, the fact that Hemingway was the one who felt this way also injured the plaintiff's
reputation-both because Hemingway was a highly regarded personality and because he was
perceived to be the plaintiff's friend, thus stinging the plaintiff that much more. See id. at
912 (detailing Hemingway's close relationship with plaintiff).
123. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2431 (1991) (defining
as key question whether attribution of words to Masson that Masson never uttered constituted
falsity requisite to maintain libel action).
124. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1539-46 (9th Cir. 1989)
(comparing substantive meanings of Malcolm's misquotations to substantive meanings of
Masson's claimed actual remarks), rev'd, Il1 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
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atory implications arising from the attributions of the misquotations to
Masson with the implications that would have arisen from attribution of
Masson's actual remarks to Masson.125
Thus, in newspaper #I's quotation, the alleged defamatory allegation
is: "P replied, 'I feel that females of F's ilk are not tenacious enough to
successfully undertake the difficult tasks that the job entails." ' "1 26 Under
one reasonable construction, the foregoing allegation asserts that P made a
statement which would lead the public to believe that P may hold a sexist
viewpoint-probably a defamatory assertion. Comparatively, the published
attribution of P's true remarks to P-"P replied, 'I simply do not believe
that women like F are sufficiently tough to handle the complex responsibilities of the position"'-would give rise to an almost identical defamatory
impact in both subject matter and severity. Just as is the case with newspaper
#1's attribution, the revelation that P spoke the words that he actually did
utter could also lead the public to believe that P may be a sexist. In
addition, the form of wording chosen by newspaper #1 to effect its misquotation itself does not add any extra force to the sexist implication of

125. Comparison of the different analyses employed by the Supreme Court and the Ninth
Circuit to the same misquotation reveals the courts' divergent understandings of what constitutes
a false and defamatory misquotation. For example, Malcolm asked Masson about why Masson
had ended a lecture to a group of psychoanalysts with a stinging remark about the "sterility"
of psychoanalysis. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1542. Malcolm quoted MassQn as replying, "[the
remark] was totally gratuitous. I don't know why I put it in." Id. Malcolm's tape recordings
indicated that, in fact, Masson had replied, inter alia, that "[the remark] was [a] ... possibly,
gratuitously offensive way to end a paper to a group of analysts" and that his reason for
making the remark was that the remark "was true." Masson, III S. Ct. at 2426-27. In
comparing the defamatory effect of Masson's actual remarks with the effect of the purported
falsification, the Supreme Court concluded that "it is conceivable that the alteration results
in a statement that could injure a scholar's reputation." Id. at 2437. The Ninth Circuit,
though, concluded merely that the alteration "did not alter the substantive content" of
Masson's answer. Masson, 895 F.2d at 1543. The key difference between the two inquiries is
that, while the Supreme Court considered the effect arising from the attribution of the remarks
to Masson, the Ninth Circuit examined only the substantive meaning of the quoted words
themselves.
While the substantive meaning of the words enveloped by quotation marks is not the
primary element to be considered in applying the substantial truth test, this is not to imply
that such meanings are without importance. Actually, these meanings are necessarily part of
the consideration of the substantial truth of the defamatory implications in the attribution of
the misquotation to the speaker. The point is merely that two statements attributed to a
speaker may be roughly synonymous, yet each may yield different defamatory implications
regarding the plaintiff. See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text (illustrating how denotatively synonymous statements can reflect differently upon reader).
126. The defamatory assertion in each hypothetical misquotation is the attribution of the
particular remarks to P-not the remarks themselves. This is important to grasp in applying
the substantial truth doctrine because the implications and meanings of "P said, '[actual
statement]' and "P said, '[misquotation]'
are what must be compared, not the meaning of
the actual statement alone to the misquotation alone. Of course, the meanings of the true and
false remarks still play a substantial role in determining the meaning of the attributions. See
supra notes 124-25 (describing role played by substantive meaning of remarks in determining
effect of attribution of remarks).
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the attribution of P's original statement to P: first, the tone of both is
equally business like and lacking in rhetorical hyperbole; and second, in
both formulations the idea that P's message is sexist is not entirely clear,
because what is meant by "females of F's ilk" and "women like F" in
relation to the rest of the remarks is subject to debate. Thus, because the
defamatory impact of the material does not arise from the falsification of
the form, newspaper #1's allegation is substantially true. As such, whether
or not newspaper #1 knew of the formal falsification, P can have no cause
of action against the newspaper for the misquotation.
In contrast to newspaper #1's formulation, the version of P's remarks
offered by newspaper #2 is not only false on a formal level, but is
substantively inaccurate as well. In the actual interview, P said nothing at
all about sending F to Phoenix, nor did he discuss any aspect of the

company's Phoenix branch-that is, newspaper #2's misquotation would
not even be an adequate paraphrase of P's actual remarks. Whether or not
a court or jury would deem misquotation #2 to be substantially true hinges
largely on the factfinder's viewpoint regarding the breadth of the defamatory
sting of the false attribution. 27 For example, a broad interpretation of the
defamatory effect in newspaper #2 might be "P is a sexist," while a narrow
127. Although the substantial truth analysis turns on how broad the court determines the
"sting" of a defamatory statement to be, few courts have explained how they arrive at this
determination. In Schiavone Constr. Co. v. Time, Inc., one of the few recent cases that has
addressed the issue, the Third Circuit explained that determining the breadth of defamatory
gist is a function of the jury, because reasonable minds could differ on the subject. 847 F.2d
1069, 1084 (3d Cir. 1988). In Schiavone the plaintiff brought suit against Time Magazine for
publishing allegations that the plaintiff's name appeared several times in FBI files regarding
the disappearance of Jimmy Hoffa. Id. at 1074. The court admitted that reasonable minds
could differ as to the scope of the defamatory "sting" of the allegation, with possibilities
including: generally, that the plaintiff's name appeared in files concerning the mafia; that the
plaintiff's name appeared specifically in the Hoffa investigation file; that the plaintiff was
involved with the mafia; or that the plaintiff was involved in the notorious probable murder
of Hoffa. Id. at 1084. The Schiavone court held that the question of substantial truth must
go to the jury because the determination depended on how the jury interpreted the sting of
the published allegation. Id. at 1085.
In Vachet v. Central Newspapers, Inc., 816 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1987), the Seventh Circuit
explained that, to determine the "gist" or "sting" of a publication, a court must look to the
highlight and hurtfulness of the article and not to immaterial details. Id. at 316. The plaintiff
in Vachet complained that the defendant newspaper had falsely reported that the plaintiff was
arrested, pursuant to a court-issued warrant, for harboring a fugitive rapist. Id. In fact,
although such an arrest occurred, it was not pursuant to a warrant. Id. The court held that
the defamatory "gist" of the published material was the implication that the plaintiff had
associated with the suspected rapist of an old woman and that, therefore, the allegation was
substantially true. Id. However, the Vachet court failed to explain how it arrived at its
particular interpretation of the defamatory gist. The court's failure in this regard implies the
unlikely result that the newspaper could have printed any set of facts implying that the plaintiff
had associated with the alleged rapist and still could have won on summary judgment for
having printed the substantial truth. Presumably, the Seventh Circuit would not rule this way
if faced with the question directly. Therefore, although some courts have acknowledged that
the scope of a defamation may be open to various interpretations, they have provided little
guidance regarding how the issue should be resolved.
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interpretation might be "P has the gall to relegate an employee to the nonprestigious Phoenix post simply because she is a female." If a decisionmaker were to adopt the former interpretation, then misquotation #2 is
substantially true, as would be thousands of other sexist remarks that the
newspaper could place in P's mouth. If a court or jury chose the narrower
view, then the misquotation could not be considered substantially true at
all.
Realistically, a court addressing newspaper #2's situation might tread a
middle ground and consider the defamation to be something like: "P does
not believe that women are capable of handling the demanding jobs within
the company." If this measure of sting is used, there would be little question
that misquotation #2 conveys the substantial truth of the defamatory gist
of P's real remarks. The effect of both attributions is to make P possibly
appear to be sexist in making his personnel decisions. In fact, newspaper
2's formulation may actually cause milder injury to P than his original
statement. First, newspaper #2 at least credited P with acknowledging that
F was capable of handling another presumably prominent position in the
company-a factor which might lead readers to temper their suspicions
about P's sexism. Second, while newspaper #2 quotes P as saying that "a
woman like F would be better suited" to a "low pressure" environment,
this combination may portray P as being more subtle in willingly exposing
his sexism than does P's actual claim that "women like F" are not
"sufficiently tough" for the position in question. Although the form and
substantive meanings of misquotation #2 and P's actual remarks are quite
different, then, their defamatory effects are quite similar-similar enough
that most courts would probably deem newspaper #2's attribution to be
substantially true and, thus, nonactionable.
The falsity of newspaper #3's misquotation is similar to that of newspaper #l's misquotation-the defendant has formally misquoted the speaker,
yet has been substantially faithful to the word-for-word denotative meaning
of the speaker's actual remarks. Here, however, the defamatory sting of
the misquotation is quite obviously more harmful to P than are his actual
remarks. Misquotation #3 exposes the mistake of comparing, as the Ninth
Circuit did in its Masson decision, only the substantive meanings of the
remarks, as opposed to comparing the defamatory implications arising from
attribution of the remarks. Substantively, misquotation #3 is similar to P's
actual remarks, but the defamatory implications the public may draw from
newspaper #3's attribution are far more hurtful to P than attribution of
the original statement would be. This is because the form through which
an individual chooses to convey her ideas can be as revealing of the
individual as the ideas themselves. 12

128. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2430 (1991) (explaining

that attribution of particular remark to speaker may cause reputational injury if manner of
expression or fact that statement was made at all would indicate negative attitude or trait
possessed by speaker). The Supreme Court cited two ways in which the false attribution of a
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In his article Language, Truth, and the First Amendment: An Essay in
Memory of Harry Canter Professor Frederick Schauer demonstrated that
statements, even apparently factual statements, often include elements of
opinion, belief, interpretation, or emotion. 129 Word choices made by a
speaker often bare the speaker's beliefs and emotions to the public, whether
the speaker intends this occurrence or not. When a writer paraphrases a
statement made by a speaker, the writer, by her word choice, reveals her
own opinions and emotions about what the speaker said. 30 However, when
a writer paraphrases a speaker and, by use of quotation marks, attributes
the words verbatim to the speaker, the writer is assigning her opinions and
emotions to the speaker. If these opinions and emotions injure the reputation
of those who are believed to possess them, then, through use of quotation
marks, the writer has defamed the plaintiff even though the writer may not
have changed the substantive content of the speaker's remarks.
The United States Supreme Court recognized the emotional force of
particular word choices in its decision in Cohen v. California.3' The Cohen

statement to an individual might harm the person's reputation. Id. First, the purported
statement might assert directly an unsavory claim regarding the speaker. Id. For example, the
speaker might be quoted as admitting he had been convicted of a crime when he actually had
not. Id. Second, the claimed speaker might suffer reputational harm because of the manner
in which he was reported to have expressed his thoughts or because of the idea that he made
a particular statement at all. Id. As an example of the latter, the Court recalled John Lennon's
reported statement regarding the Beatles that "[w]e're more popular than Jesus Christ now."
Id. Irrespective of whether the underlying claim in Lennon's assertion was true, the fact that
he was claimed to have said it may have injurid his reputation. Id.
129. Schauer, supra note 67, at 279 n.64.
130. For example, if newspaper #3 had paraphrased its version of P's remarks to "P
replied that little fillies like her are too damn cute and fragile for a big, scary job like that,"
the obnoxious and condescending tone of the remarks would be attributable the newspaper.
One can imagine a reporter, outraged at P's seemingly sexist remarks, sarcastically paraphrasing
what P said to evidence the reporter's displeasure with P's comments. In such a case, P
probably would have no cause of action for the change because newspaper #3 was merely
using permissible rhetorical hyperbole-in a way that makes clear that it is the newspaper's
hyperbole, not P's-to summarize and convey its opinion of P's remarks. See National Ass'n
Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 285-86 (1974) (allowing use of word "scab" to
describe strike-breakers as merely being reflection of union members strong feeling on subject);
Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14 (1970) (holding that use of word
"blackmail" to describe defendant's legal activity was, in context, not falsehood, but merely
"rhetorical hyperbole" reflecting public's strong feeling on subject).
131. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen the United States Supreme Court held that a state
may not outlaw, consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, mere public display
of an offensive word. Id. at 26. The appellant, Cohen, had been arrested for walking through
a courthouse corridor wearing a jacket adorned with the phrase "fuck the draft." Id. at 16.
Cohen was subsequently convicted before the Superior Court of Los Angeles County for
disturbing the peace. Id. The conviction was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal. Id.
at 17. After the California Supreme Court refused to review the appellate decision, the
appellant turned to the United States Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case on appeal.
Id. The Supreme Court, in reversing the decision of the California Court of Appeal, held that
the epithet displayed on the appellant's jacket was speech-not conduct-constitutionally
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 18, 26. Key to the Court's ruling
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majority pointed out that language fulfills two communicative functions:
the conveyance of ideas capable of precise and objective explication and
the conveyance of emotions not otherwise capable of expression13 2 The
Court recognized that the emotive function of a statement is often the most
important element in conveying the message a speaker or writer is attempting
to communicate."' In his dissent in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation Justice

Brennan further stressed that neither the content of a message, nor the
effect of the message on those who receive it is separable from the words
chosen to convey the message.3 4 Brennan also emphasized that, in Cohen
the Supreme Court already had agreed that word choice cannot "surgically3
1
be separated" from the thoughts that the speaker is attempting to convey.

1

Thus, when the appellant in Cohen chose the words "fuck the draft" to
convey his opinion of the Vietnam War draft, he conveyed an emotive
message that he could not have communicated through the literally synonymous phrase "I disagree violently with the draft, wish to have no part of

36
it, and urge others to share my views.'
In a similar fashion, newspaper #3's allegation that "P replied, 'I think
little fillies like her are just too damned cute and fragile to be successful
in a big, scary job like that" is charged with an emotive force that the
attribution of P's original remarks to P would not have been. The effect

was the idea that the particular words chosen to convey an idea are often the most important
component of the expression. Id. at 26. The Supreme Court held that, absent compelling
reasons (for example, that the words might incite violence), a state could not consistently with
the First and Fourteenth Amendments criminalize the display of profane language. Id. at 20,
26. Justices Burger and Blackmun dissented, inter alia, on the ground that the appellant's
display of the vulgar phrase was more conduct than speech and, as such, did not warrant
First Amendment protection. Id. at 27.
132. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). Cf. Southern Air Transport, Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Cos., 877 F.2d 1010, 1015 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (pointing out that
defamatory effect of television report could not be fully understood by reading transcript alone
and that understanding of emotive force required viewing of visual portion as well).
133. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26. See Schauer, supra note 67, at 279 n.64 (illustrating the
manner in which denotatively synonymous word choices may differ in connotative meaning).
Professor Schauer, writing about the presence of opinion, emotion and value judgment in
speech that is otherwise regarded as factual, lucidly demonstrates the effect that word choice
may have on the meaning conveyed to the audience. He states:
If I refer to someone as an alcoholic, I should be referring to a relatively identifiable
illness ....But if instead I use the word "drunk," I may have the same object in
mind, as well as the same inferences, but I have added a degree of negative personal
judgment.... If I refer to someone as a "theoretical academician," I am probably
being complimentary, but if I call that same person an "egghead," the meaning
changes substantially.
Id.
134. 438 U.S. 726, 773 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan opined that "[t]he idea
that the content of a message and its potential impact on any who might receive it can be
divorced from the words that are the vehicle for its expression is transparently fallacious. A
given word may have a unique capacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emotion, or conjure up
an image." Id.
135. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 773 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
136. Schauer, supra note 67, at 280.
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that this new emotive force has on how the reading public may perceive P
is profound. The manner in which newspaper #3 claims P addressed F's
employment situation makes the possibility implicit in P's actual statementthat P may be a sexist-appear to be a truism. In addition to making the
existence of P's sexism appear more probable, newspaper #3's attribution
also makes any sexist outlook that P may. possess appear much more severe.
The public is led to believe not only that P discriminates against females
in personnel decisions, but also that P sees fit to denigrate verbally female
employees in public because of their gender. Finally, newspaper #3's allegation may be construed to injure P's reputation in ways totally different
from the implications arising from his original comments. Among these
wholly new and topically discrete defamations could be: that P is generally
condescending; that P is profane; that P is insensitive; and that P has poor
public relations-and, perhaps, business-judgment. Thus, although newspaper #3 may claim that its misquotation did not change the technical
substance of P's remarks, the formal falsification in which the newspaper
did partake inflicted significant harm to P's reputation, in addition to any
harm P may have suffered via publication of his actual words. Because
newspaper #3 did publish a defamatory falsity, then, its publication is
37
actionable if newspaper #3 knew of the false form of the quotation.
Determining the relationship between falsity and defamation in newspaper #4's misquotation is a relatively elementary task. Here, a court need
not dwell excessively upon the subtle effect that the use of quotation marks
may have because the entire premise behind the misquotations is false and
defamatory-P never addressed the subject matter embodied in the misquotation. As was the case in Bindrim3 1 and Carson,39 even if the defendant
had chosen to attribute these remarks to P through paraphrase, the paraphrase would be almost as false and defamatory, because the harm lies
primarily in the idea expressed rather than in the form by which the idea
is conveyed. Newspaper #4 attributed to P remarks implying that P had
made romantic overtures to F and giving the impression that P's personnel
decisions regarding females were based upon their providing sexual favors.
Such implications sting P significantly more than the implied sexism in P's
original remarks. Although P actually did make a comment implying that
gender was a consideration in his personnel decisions, P's comments had
no connotations of sexual harassment. 40 Because newspaper #4's misquotation is false in both form and substance and inflicts a substantially
different and more severe defamatory sting than would quotation of P's

137. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (explaining that public
figures may recover for defamation only if public figure proves defendant knew of or recklessly
disregarded existence of defamatory falsity).
138. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
139. Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206 (7th Cir. 1976).
140. In response to the reporter's question regarding possible sexual advances on F, P
replied only that the "question [did] not merit a response."
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original comments, the misquotation and, in fact, even an identically worded
paraphrase is actionable if newspaper #4 knew of the falsity.
The four misquotations in the hypothetical exemplify four general
categories of misquotation: a nondefamatory change in form only; a nondefamatory change in form and substance; a defamatory change in form
only; and a defamatory change in form and substance. To these four one
may add two more categories that may not properly be termed "misquotation": a nondefamatory change in substance only; and a defamatory
change in substance only. These types of quotations are correct in that they
accurately reflect a portion of what the speaker said, but are edited or
presented in such a way as to inaccurately convey the meaning intended by
the speaker. 41 Again, the crucial element in determining whether such a
quotation is substantially true is whether the injury inflicted by the edited
quotation is materially different from that which would have resulted from
publication of the full quotation, with all of its qualifications.
After establishing that a defamatory falsity exists comes the task of
determining the defendant's state of mind with regard to that falsity. If
clear and convincing proof exists by which a jury reasonably can decide
that the defendant either knew of or recklessly disregarded the defamatory
falsity at the time of publication, then the case may go to a jury to decide
the actual malice question. 42 Although the actual malice concept is itself
fraught with ambiguities, the complexities of the standard's application are
greatly reduced when a court first methodically investigates the issues of
falsity and defamation and the connection between the latter two elements.
In the hypothetical, because the defamatory falsity analysis established that
the injurious effect of the misquotations published by newspapers #1 and
#2 did not arise from any changes that those newspapers made, the actual
malice inquiry with regard to those two misquotations is moot. If there is
no defamatory falsity, there can be no liability on the part of the defendant
regardless of his state of mind at the time of publication. 43 Having eliminated the first two hypothetical quotations from the actual malice inquiry,
the investigation focuses upon determining what sort of knowledge should
suffice to establish actual malice in those cases where the plaintiff has
44
established the existence of a defamatory falsehood.'

141. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 895 F.2d 1535, 1545-46 (9th Cir. 1989)
(addressing quotations allegedly misleadingly edited by Malcolm), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
142. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (stating that summary
judgment is not proper if reasonable jury could find clear and convincing proof of actual
malice).
143. See Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1196 (9th Cir. 1989)
(explaining that existing case law allows recovery for defamation only if speech contains
defamatory statement of untrue fact), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 59 (1990).
144. In the general field of libel, some advocate that, to prove actual malice, the plaintiff
not only be required to show that the defendant knew of the falsity, but also that the defendant
knew that the falsity would defame the plaintiff in the eyes of the reading public. See Franklin
& Bussel, The Plaintiffs Burden in Defamation: Awareness and Falsity 25 Wm. & MARY L.
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The misquotation promulgated by newspaper #3 in the hypothetical
represents cases where the denotative meaning of a speaker's statement
remains relatively constant, but where the form is falsified so as to make
the attribution of the statement to the speaker put the speaker in a more
defamatory light than would attribution of the actual remarks. Because the
added reputational harm to the speaker arises only from the erroneous
attribution to the speaker of obnoxious phraseology and does not result

from any change in the denotative meaning of the speaker's message, logic
dictates that the actual malice determination here rationally can be based

upon the defendant's knowledge that the form of the quotation was falsified.
In this case, whether or not the newspaper believes that it has changed the
substance of P's remarks is irrelevant because the injury is not caused by
any change in substance. If newspaper #3 knows that it led the public to
believe that P conveyed his ideas in a way that, in reality, P did not, then
the newspaper has published with actual malice and is open to damages for
libel.
However, in the case of newspaper #4, where the defamatory falsity
lies in the subject matter of the statement, it is logically more difficult to
characterize the newspaper's knowledge of the false form of the quotation,
without more, as actual malice. 45 If newspaper #4 knows that, in fact, P
said nothing about P expecting female employees to succumb to his romantic
overtures, actual malice is established because the newspaper is aware that
the defamatory premise behind the quotation is false."" However, if news-

REv. 825, 845-47- (1984). At the very least, a defendant must know of the meaning that is
defamatory-implicit in the subjective nature of the actual malice standard. Fong v. Merena,
655 P.2d 875, 877 (Haw. 1982). The reasons for and against requiring defendants to know of
the defamatory nature of their publication are numerous, and in-depth exploration of this
topic is beyond the scope of this note. The important point is that, however the actual malice
standard is interpreted, the standard is no different for misquotation cases than it is for libel
cases in general. But see Comment, supra note 67, at 1384-85 (suggesting that, in misquotation
cases, courts require plaintiffs to show that defendant knew he was defaming plaintiff to
establish actual malice).
145. If the defendant publisher has accomplished an actionable defamation of the plaintiff
that he could not have done by merely paraphrasing the plaintiff's statements, then the
defendant's knowledge that he has attributed words to the speaker that the speaker did not
utter should suffice for actual malice. In other words, one must differentiate between the
effect of having the words in question coming out of the mouth of the writer and the effect
of having them coming out of the mouth of the purported speaker. In the case of newspaper
#4, publishing "P replied that any woman that refuses him should not expect a promotion
anytime soon," and actually quoting P do not seem to elicit very different levels of defamation.
The words coming directly out of P's mouth are a little more credible than the paraphrase,
but essentially the defamatory impact of both formulations is the same. In this situation, then,
hinging actual malice merely upon the defendant's knowledge that some words in P's quotation
were falsified would not be proper because the great majority of the harm in the attribution
comes from the denotative substance. Although far-fetched in this hypothetical, .if newspaper
#4 actually did not know that, by rewording P's statement, it had changed the meaning of
the quotation, then that newspaper should not be liable, for it did not act with actual malice
with regard to the falsity that is injuring P's reputation.
146. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (describing how in hypothetical case
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paper #4, while realizing that it misquoted the plaintiff, honestly believed
that the misquotation conveyed the substantive meaning of P's remarks,
the logical case for actual malice becomes much more obscure. That the
newspaper could have succeeded in implying the same essential defamatory
facts through paraphrase demonstrates that the use of quotation marks is
not itself the primary source of harm. The misquotation is just incidentally
the means by which newspaper #4 chose to convey incorrect information
regarding the substance of P's comments. 47 Therefdre, to base a finding of
actual malice solely on the newspaper's knowledge that it inaccurately quoted
P would run counter to the New York Times requirement of subjective
knowledge that the element giving rise to defamation is false.'1 Where a
publisher knowingly alters a quotation-perhaps believing that he is merely
"tidying up" the quotation-yet does not believe that he is changing the
meaning of the quotation, that publisher logically cannot be held liable for
defamation arising from a change in meaning.' 49

of newspaper #4, discrete inquiry into knowledge of misquotation is unnecessary because entire

premise behind quotation is false).
147. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (1991) (stating

that inquiry into actual malice turns on punctuation to extent that punctuation conveys
meaning).
148. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (emphasizing subjective nature of
New York Times actual malice standard). The subjective knowledge problem is probably the

most compelling argument against using defendant's knowledge of misquotation alone to
establish actual malice in cases exemplified by misquotation #4. See Schauer, supra note 67,
at 263-65 (illustrating result when court fails to consider defendant's subjective knowledge of

meaning). Critics have complained that courts often fail to use a subjective standard when
determining whether a defendant acted with actual malice. See Franklin & Bussel, supra note
144, at 840-41 (emphasizing that when courts use objective standard for determining meaning
of published material, defendants may be held liable for unintended defamatory meanings).
For example, Professor Franklin argues that "It]he use of a reasonable person standard by
the courts for determining the meaning of a statement would expose those who are less welleducated, less well-advised, less adept with language, or simply less intelligent, to the risk of
liability for meanings that they never contemplated." Id.
Some courts have held that a defendant acted with actual malice in publishing words
which, taken literally, would be defamatory even when the defendant intended and believed
that the words would be understood in a nondefamatory figurative sense. See Sprouse v. Clay
Communication, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674, 685-87, 693 (W. Va. 1975) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882
(1975) (upholding award of actual damages against defendant for describing plaintiff's wholly
legal dealings with terms such as "land grab," "bonanza" and "dummy firm"). Regarding
Sprouse, Professor Schauer states,
Although the court did acknowledge the multiple meanings of the words, in essence
it used the same evidence to find falsity as to infer actual malice. This is a rather
egregious bootstrap argument....
...
[I]f
the average person would interpret the words as implying some illegal
activity, then this is an archetypal example of majoritarian restrictions on language
becoming restrictions on conveying the ideas themselves.
Schauer, supra note 67, at 286-87.
149. For example, reporter R asks P what P likes to do when he is not busy with his
corporate duties. P replies, "I enjoy taking pictures." The reporter, because of limited space,
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However, granting that on a theoretical level the subjectivity argument
has substantial merit, one hardly can deny that there is a very strong
practical positive correlation between the false form of a quotation and the
differences between the implications which arise from that misquotation

and from the speaker's actual remarks. If nothing else, knowledge of
misquotation is certainly substantial evidence that a publisher at least
recklessly has disregarded any substantive change that such misquotation

may have wrought.5 0 First, as the facts of Masson illustrate, the formal
and substantive aspects of a quotation rarely can be separated with preci-

sion.' 5' Simply put, both changes in the particular wording employed and

changes in the subject matter addressed can change the meaning of a

52
statement as perceived by an audience.
Second, even in cases where a paraphrase containing the same wording
as the direct quotation would be itself false and defamatory, the addition

of quotation marks invariably adds to defamatory impact by increasing the

credibility of the statement. In the case of paraphrase, the reading public
is at least aware that some amount of the author's interpretation has been
injected into the statement. Use of quotation marks, however, precludes
this possibility. Thus, even if the subject matter of an attributed statement
is the primary source of reputational harm, a direct quotation almost
invariably will have more defamatory impact than a paraphrase encom-

passing the same subject matter. In fact, the latter phenomenon is one
conceivable reason why a publisher might knowingly choose to misquote,

needs to shorten P's quotation so that it will fit at the end of his column. R shortens P's
quote by hand to "I enjoy photography," but, because of R's poor handwriting, the typist
believes that R meant the quotation to read "I enjoy pornography." Although R knows that
he has changed the wording of P's quotation, he believes he has only inserted one innocuous
synonym for another and that he has not changed the substantive meaning in the slightest.
Should one consider R to have acted with actual malice simply because he knew that he was
changing a few words in P's statement? Any reading of the actual malice standard that would
bring R's state of mind in the foregoing example within its penumbra would be a bastardization
of the entire concept of actual malice. Here, R's motive in changing P's quotation could
hardly be characterized as sinister. R only wanted to shorten the quotation and neither intended
to, nor believed he did change the meaning of the message that P had relayed to him. Should
R be held liable merely because he knew that the misquotation was false in that P actually
used a different pattern of words? Consider the fact that if R had merely paraphrased P's
remarks into "P says that he enjoys pornography," the publication still would be almost, if
not just as, false and defamatory as the direct quotation. Yet most courts would not consider
the inaccurate paraphrase to be the result of actual malice, assuming that the typist had
accidentally misread the word "photography."
150. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) (explaining that actual malice
standard requires plaintiff to produce evidence sufficient to allow conclusion that defendant
actually had serious doubts regarding truth of publication).
151. As used in the hypothetical, the form/substance dichotomy is merely an artificial
analytical device used to illuminate the Ninth Circuit's failure to recognize that particular word
choices made by a speaker sometimes heavily contribute to the meaning that the receiving
audience perceives.
152. See supra notes 129-36 and accompanying text (discussing interplay of form and
substance in creating meaning of statements).
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rather than paraphrase, a speaker-purported direct quotations give each
allegation and the story as a whole more credibility in the eyes of the
reader.15 3 Finally, the knowing misquotation of a speaker may evince a
conscious attempt by the publisher to deceive the reader. Courts should not
ignore the possibility that the deception achieved was the deception intended
by the publisher.
Therefore, although use of publisher's knowledge of misquotation to
establish irrebuttable actual malice is improper where the choice of words
itself is not the cause of defamation, logic suggests that courts should not
completely ignore this knowledge. The defendant's proven knowledge of
misquotation can be rationally employed to establish a rebuttable presumption of actual malice in cases where existence of a defamatory falsity has
been shown.15 4 A court should proceed on the rational assumption that a
publisher is aware of the common meanings attached to the words and
phrases he is employing. If the assumption is accurate, then the publisher
cannot help but know in which circumstances he has altered the meaning
of a quotation by changing its wording. If for some reason the publisher
was not aware that his formal changes produced a change in substantive
meaning, then the publisher merely would need to come forward with some
evidence to that effect to rebut the actual malice presumption. The burden
would then fall on the plaintiff to prove that the publisher was, in fact,
aware that he was changing the substantive meaning of the quotation in
question.155

153. See Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 212-13 (7th Cir. 1976) (describing
reporter who already had fabricated facts behind story as also creating quotations to support
falsified facts). In Carson the defendant's reporter presumably believed that his story about
Johnny Carson's move to California would have more credibility in the eyes of the reader if
the story contained purported quotations of comments seemingly made by Carson.
154. See Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that sufficient circumstantial evidence of actual malice can overcome defendant's bare assertion
of good faith). In a misquotation case, knowledge of the misquotation would seem to fall
within the "sufficient circumstantial evidence" category.
155. In the event that the defendant is able to rebut the assumption of actual malice, the
fact that the defendant knowingly altered the quotations still would remain, of course, a major
element in the in the plaintiff's arsenal of circumstantial evidence. Although actual malice is
a subjective state of mind, its existence may be proved by circumstantial evidence such as
knowledge of misquotation would be in this situation. Zerangue, 814 F.2d at 1070. The
Zerangue court explained that "[allthough the defendant's state of mind is a subjective fact,
it can be shown by indirect or circumstantial evidence." See also Golden Bear Distrib. Systems
of Texas, Inc. v. Chase Revel, Inc., 708 F.2d 944, 950 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that reporter's
notes showing reporter was aware of facts contradicting her story were enough to sustain
finding of actual malice).
In the case of the quotation which, though it contains statements actually made by the
purported speaker, is taken out of context or is edited in such a way as to convey a meaning
not intended by the speaker, inquiry into knowledge of the falsity of the form is irrelevant
because the form has not been falsified. Here, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
actually knew that the defendant was conveying a substantive meaning different from that
intended by the speaker.
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This employment of defendants' knowledge of misquotation would
fulfill the core purpose of the actual malice rule. The purpose behind the
actual malice rule is not only to prevent the chilling of free speech, but
also to continue to protect reputational interests to a reasonable degree. 5 6
Therefore, when a court vindicates damage to an individual's reputation
without encroaching upon material free speech interests, the court is fulfilling
the central aim of the actual malice standard. To use a defendant's knowledge of misquotation in establishing actual malice is to protect valid reputational interests while still allowing publishers to practice their interpretation
and poetic license through paraphrase-a mode by which the reader will
not be deceived as to the nature of the information she is receiving.
In the future, misquotations on which libel actions may be based most
likely will not be susceptible to the strict categorization between formal and
substantial changes as those in the hypothetical were. Instead, as in Masson,
alteration of a speaker's remarks probably will effect a change in both form
and substantive meaning. Because of this, proof of the defendant's knowledge that misquotation has occurred should in every case establish at least
a presumption of -actual malice rebuttable only by presentation of evidence
that the defendant was unaware that she was changing the substantive
meaning of the speaker's remarks. In addition, if the plaintiff can establish
that the alleged defamation could not have been effected but through the
use of quotation marks-that is, the defamation arose largely from the way
in which something was purportedly stated by the speaker-then the defendant's proven knowledge of misquotation should be considered to be irre57
buttable proof of actual malice.
Courts must not be disconcerted by the complexities of a misquotation
case. By first determining whether the defendant has falsified the quotation
in question in a way that defames the plaintiff, the court can eliminate a
large portion of possible libel actions. 5 By then requiring plaintiff to prove
that the defendant knowingly misquoted the speaker, another group of
misquotation cases would be subject to summary judgment. If the plaintiff
succeeded in carrying his burden of proof regarding knowledge of misquotation and also showed that the use of quotation marks itself gave rise to
actionable defamation, actual malice would be established. If the plaintiff
proved knowledge of misquotation, but failed to show that the use of
quotation marks was itself defamatory, the actual malice presumption would
be rebuttable merely by the defendant's production of evidence that there
was no subjective knowledge of changed substantive meaning. We need not

156. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43 (1974). If free speech were to be
protected at any cost, there would be no actual malice standard-all speech would be absolutely
immune from legal attack. Id.
157. See supra notes 128-37 and accompanying text (illustrating case where form of
quotation is only defamatory falsity).
158. Elimination of those cases where no defamatory falsity exists, would of course,
preclude action on those quotations for which a publisher had merely corrected syntax, or
eliminated stammering or hesitations.
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use blunt tools in applying First Amendment protections when we have
precision instruments that will protect free speech equally as well without
encroaching upon other vital interests.
ERic MEYER RAUDENBUSH

